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Abstract 
Power sharing is modeled as a duel over some prize.  Each of two players may 
either share the prize in some ratio or fire at the other player—either in sequence or 
simultaneously—and eliminate it with a specified probability.  If one player eliminates 
the other without being eliminated itself, it captures the entire prize, but the prize is 
damaged over time when there is shooting. 
Simultaneous shooting, which is more damaging than sequential shooting, tends to 
induce the players to share the prize and expand their opportunities for sharing it.  It was 
effectively implemented by the superpowers with the doctrine of “launch on warning” 
during the Cold War, and it was strengthened by the development of second-strike 
capability.  Deterring terrorism has proved a different matter, because terrorists are 
difficult to detect and present few targets that can be damaged.  
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Stabilizing Power Sharing1 
1. Introduction 
Power sharing has been problematic from time immemorial.  Children have 
difficulty sharing toys and desserts.  Couples have difficulty dividing responsibilities. 
In the corporate world, it is rare for two CEOs to share power without crossing 
swords.  After a merger, quarrels between the CEOs of the merged companies are 
common; sometimes they become so fierce that one CEO is forced out.  Such a power 
struggle is almost always detrimental to the new company, occasionally leading to its 
collapse. 
At the national level, no country in the world officially has two presidents or two 
prime ministers.  When two party leaders agree to share the prime ministership, then one 
typically holds this position for one period followed by the other’s taking the reins for 
another period.2   
When there is power sharing among political parties in parliamentary democracies 
because no party wins a majority of seats in the parliament, it is most often of cabinet 
ministries.  Usually the largest party is awarded the prime ministership, and there is no 
simultaneous sharing of this prize. 
At the international level, it is quite common for countries to rotate offices in an 
international organization.  A new secretary-general of the United Nations never comes 
from the same country and almost never from the same region of the world as his or her 
                                                 
1 We thank Eric S. Dickson for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
2 This happened, for example, when a national-unity government, comprising the two largest parties in 
Israel, assumed power over the 4-year period from 1983 to 1986. Itzhak Shamir of the Likud Party was 
prime minister for the first two years, and Shimon Peres of the Labor Party for the next two years. 
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predecessor, just as the presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union 
rotates every six months among its 27 members.  Still, the largest countries in these 
organizations often exercise veto power—de facto or de jure—and sharing is anything 
but equal among the members of these organizations.   
We focus in this paper on two-party power-sharing agreements and ask which 
factors make them stable.  In a previous paper (Brams and Kilgour, 2007), we developed 
game-theoretic models in which players could agree to share power or engage in a duel.  
Each player had an unlimited number of bullets to expend, round by round.   
By firing at an opponent and, with a specified probability, eliminating it, a player 
could capture all the assets.  But because we assumed that the players were not perfect 
shots, shooting was not a surefire strategy to acquire these assets.  
Ominously, we found that power sharing was almost never rational, however the 
assets were divided and however they were discounted in repeated play.  Because the 
players almost always had an incentive to shoot, there was a “race to preempt.”   
The only way we found to slow down this race was to postulate that shooting 
would cause damage in each period that it occurred.  But even this damage was often 
insufficient to deter the players from shooting, because they still received benefits in each 
period they survived.   
If only one player survived, it benefited the most, because it received all the 
remaining assets.  Because these assets were discounted or damaged more heavily the 
longer play continued, a player did best by eliminating its opponent early, which was 
abetted by its being a good shot.  
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In this paper, we assume that the game the duelists play is different from the ones 
we analyzed earlier.  While repeated, it does not bestow payoffs on the players in each 
period that shooting occurs and neither is eliminated.  Instead, there is a single prize, 
awarded at the end of play, which goes to 
• both players if they agree to share it; or 
• one or neither player if they refuse to share it and instead fire at each other until    
  one or both is eliminated.  
We consider two possibilities for shooting—that it may occur either sequentially or 
simultaneously.  Although power sharing can occur for each possibility, the power-
sharing region is considerably enlarged when shooting is simultaneous.  Simultaneity also 
makes more sharing arrangements stable, so players have greater opportunity to design an 
agreement without fear that it will be abrogated.   
2.  Notation and Assumptions 
Assume there are two players, P and Q.  Power is a prize that both players may 
share at any time and has an initial value of 1.3  If P and Q decide to share the prize, they 
do so in the ratio of a : (1 – a), which is a ratio that we assume was set before play 
commenced.  If the value of the prize when the players agree to share it is v, then P 
receives a payoff of av, and Q a payoff of (1 – a)v. 
Alternatively, P and Q may attempt to eliminate one another.  If P fires at Q, Q is 
eliminated with probability p; if Q fires at P, P is eliminated with probability q.  When a 
                                                 
3 Power is often conceptualized as a relationship between players, not a good they may share.  Because it is 
not apparent what sharing means in a power relationship, we posit a divisible good (prize) that the players 
agree to share or, by shooting, try to capture entirely. 
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player is eliminated, its payoff is 0.  The survivor, if any, wins the entire prize. We 
assume that there is no disgrace or other penalty incurred from firing and missing an 
opponent.  
Once started, firing proceeds in rounds as long as both players survive. If one or 
both players are eliminated, the game terminates, and the survivor, if any, receives the 
prize at that time.   
In any round, both players have one opportunity to eliminate their opponent.  A 
round of shooting in which neither player is eliminated reduces the value of the prize by a 
factor of 1 – s, which reflects the damage caused by firing.  Consequently, the prize is 
worth 1 in the first round, s in the second round, s2 in the third round, and so on.  If there 
are n rounds of fighting in which neither player is eliminated, and if the prize is then won 
during the (n + 1)st round, then it is worth sn.   
The payoff to a player is the expected value of the prize it receives.  The players 
value nothing else, and firing has no cost.4 
To avoid trivial cases, we usually assume that 0 < a < 1, 0 < s < 1, 0 < p < 1, and 0 
< q < 1, and their values are common knowledge.  While a may be related to the other 
parameters, including p, q, or s, we assume no specific relationship in our models.  
Instead, we identify the values of a (in terms of p, q, and s) that make sharing the prize—
as opposed to fighting for it—a rational choice of the players. 
Unlike our earlier models (Brams and Kilgour, 2007), we assume there are no 
interim rewards—in particular, there is no accumulation of payoffs, round by round, as 
                                                 
4 This no-cost assumption differs from that in most economic models, in which players use up resources 
when they attack one another.  We do not develop such a model here in order to focus on the conditions 
that discourage fighting when it is not costly.  But cost considerations come into play indirectly—fighting 
makes the prize less valuable.  
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long as the players survive.5  In particular, neither player receives anything until (i) each 
agrees to share the prize (once and for all), or (ii) at least one player is eliminated.   
While time plays no direct role in our models, the players know that play cannot 
continue indefinitely (see note 4).  The damage parameter, s, is effectively a discount 
parameter, whereby the prize shrinks in value as fighting continues.  Consequently, even 
winning all of it in some later round will be less advantageous than sharing it at the start 
of play.  
We turn next to assessing the effects of sequential versus simultaneous shooting.  
As we will show, simultaneous shooting is more likely to deter the players from firing, 
because it is more fearsome: It may cause more damage early; and it may eliminate both 
players on any round, which sequential shooting can never do. 
3.  Sequential Interaction 
We assume the players act in sequence: Either the players agree at the outset to 
share the prize, or one of them fires at its opponent.  If, say, P eliminates Q, P receives 
the prize, which has value 1.  If P fails, Q responds by firing at P.  If Q eliminates P, Q 
receives the prize, still worth 1.  But if Q also fails, the players are in the same position as 
at the start, except that the value of the prize has been reduced from 1 to s.   
We search for Nash equilibria in stationary strategies, which means that a player’s 
strategy depends only on its strategic possibilities at the moment and not on the history of 
the players’ interaction.  Thus, a stationary strategy that calls for a player to try to 
                                                 
5 If anything, costs rather than rewards accumulate as play continues.  Firing uses up ammunition and other 
resources, which are not in reality unlimited.  The models we develop probably apply best to situations in 
which P and Q have more or less equal resources, so a war of attrition does not favor either player.  While 
fighting always ends in a finite number of rounds because p and q are positive, one cannot say exactly 
when it will end, except in probabilistic terms.  
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eliminate its opponent in the first round must, if both players survive the first round, call 
for the player to try to eliminate its opponent on the second round, and so on in future 
rounds.6   
To determine whether sharing or firing is better for P, we calculate P’s expected 
reward, VP, if P fires at Q, noting that if Q survives, Q will fire back at P in the same 
round (Q has nothing to lose and possibly something to gain if it eliminates P).  Because 
both players survive with probability (1 – p)(1 – q), we have 
VP = p(1) + [(1 – p)q](0) + [(1 – p)(1 – q)](sV) = p + [(1 – p)(1 – q)](sV), 
where the sV factor on the right side of the equation reflects the continuation of the game 
to a second round in which V is reduced to sV.  If follows that  
! 
VP =
p
1" [(1" p)(1" q)]s
.               (1) 
P is rationally deterred from initiating the firing if and only if (iff) VP ≤ a, which is 
equivalent to   
! 
p "
a # as(1# q)
1# as(1# q)
.                       (2) 
                                                 
6 Why is this plausible?  Because the only feature that has changed in the second and subsequent rounds is 
the value of the prize, which has decreased, so the strategic incentives remain the same because there is 
nothing in our model that relates the size of the prize to these incentives.  To illustrate a nonstationary 
strategy, assume that after one round of firing, P chooses not to fire to try to induce its opponent to share 
the prize.  Because P‘s behavior changes in the course of play, history matters, rendering its strategy 
nonstationary. 
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The fraction on the right side of (2) is the threshold value of p for deterrence to occur—
that is, for P to prefer its share of the prize, a, to what it obtains, on average, from 
fighting. 
Note that the numerator of the right side of (2) is a[1 – s(1 – q)].  Since  
[1 – s(1 – q)] < [1 – as(1 – q)]  
because a  < 1, it follows that, independent of the values of s and q, if P is rationally 
deterred, then p < a.  If p ≥  a, (2) implies that a rational P will never be deterred from 
initiating the firing.  
Similarly, Q will be rationally deterred iff its expected value, VQ, is not greater 
than 1 – a, the value it receives from sharing.  Analogous to (2), the condition for 
deterrence of Q is 
! 
q "
1# a # s(1# a)(1# p)
1# s(1# a)(1# p)
.                                                                                        (3)  
Just as P is rationally deterred when the right side of (2) is less than a, Q is rationally 
deterred when the right side of (3) is less than 1 – a.  In particular, if q ≥ 1 – a, a rational 
Q will never be deterred from initiating the firing.  
Rewriting (3) as a condition on p and combining it with (2) shows that (2) and (3) 
both hold iff p satisfies 
! 
a " (1" q) + s(1" a)(1" q)
s(1" a)(1" q)
# p #
a " as(1" q)
1" as(1" q)
                                                          (4) 
and, of course, 0 < p < 1.  The points (q, p) defined by these conditions are shown as the 
shaded region in Figure 1 for three cases: s approaches 0; 0 < s < 1; and s approaches 1.  
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Figure 1 about here 
Inequality (4) provides both lower and upper bounds on p.  The upper bound on p 
always lies between 0 and a, and it is strictly decreasing in s and increasing in q.  It 
approaches a as s approaches 0 or as q approaches 1, and it approaches 0 as s approaches 
1 and q approaches 0.   
The lower bound for p given by (4) is nonpositive when 
! 
q "
(1# s)(1# a)
1# s(1# a)
, 
which explains why the additional condition, p > 0, may come into play.  When 
! 
(1" s)(1" a)
1" s(1" a)
< q <1" a,   
this lower bound is positive, increasing in q and decreasing in s.   
As q approaches 1, the numerator on the right side of (4) approaches a, and when q 
= 1 – a, the numerator on the left side of (4) equals 1.  Thus, for example, as q 
approaches 0, P is rationally deterred from firing iff  
! 
0 < p "
a # as
1# as
. 
As Figure 1 shows, for any fixed (positive) value of s, deterrence is possible if p 
and q are sufficiently small.  Deterrence is maximal when damage is nearly total (i.e., s is 
near 0), which occurs when p < a and q < 1 – a.  The rectangular area defined by these 
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inequalities is greatest when a = 1 – a = 1/2, rendering the deterrence region a square.  
Thus, players that share the prize equally are most likely to be deterred from firing. 
Deterrence is impossible if, when the players fire, no damage is inflicted because s 
= 1.  For the players to be deterred from shooting, therefore, they must incur some 
damage from firing, and their probabilities of eliminating their opponents must not be too 
high. 
In the special case when a = 1/2 and the players share the prize equally, the 
deterrence region—the set of (q, p) values where both players are rationally deterred from 
firing— is symmetric (it becomes a square as s approaches 0).  The corner point of the 
deterrence region opposite the origin (0, 0) is (x, x), where  
! 
x =
s"1+ s" s
2
s
. 
Note that x is a decreasing function of s, which approaches 0 as s approaches 1; it 
approaches 1/2 as s approaches 0.  When a = ½  and s approaches 0, the area of the 
deterrence region is maximal at 1/4 of the (q, p) unit square.  Thus, even in the best case 
of total damage and equal sharing, both players’ shooting accuracies cannot exceed 1/2 
for deterrence to occur.  
4.  Simultaneous Interaction 
We now assume that the players act simultaneously (or that if one player fires first, 
its opponent can return fire, regardless of whether the first shot hits its mark).  Thus, 
either the players agree at the outset to share the prize, or they fire at each other.  In the 
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latter case, it is possible for both shots to be successful, eliminating both players in any 
round, so each would receive a payoff of 0. 
If the first shot is successful and a player is therefore eliminated, it would appear 
inconsistent to allow the eliminated player to return fire.  However, there are instances of 
people who are fatally shot but, while taking their dying breath, manage to kill an 
assailant.  At the international level, a “doomsday machine” also works in this manner, 
enabling state A to destroy B even as A itself is destroyed.  By contrast, instantaneous 
reciprocation cannot happen in the sequential-interaction model, because an eliminated 
player cannot subsequently eliminate its opponent. 
As in the sequential-interaction model, the value of the prize in the simultaneous-
interaction model is reduced by the factor of 1 – s on each round if both players fire and 
neither is eliminated.  Also as before, we restrict our analysis to stationary strategies. 
To determine whether sharing or firing is better for P, we calculate P’s expected 
payoff, WP, if P fires at Q.  P will receive a positive payoff if P’s shot succeeds and Q’s 
(simultaneous) shot fails, whereas P will receive a payoff of 0 if Q’s shot succeeds.  If 
neither player’s shot hits the mark, which will occur with probability (1 – p)(1 – q), both 
players will survive and the game will continue to a new round: 
WP = [p(1 – q)](1) + q(0) + [(1 – p)(1 – q)]sW = p(1 – q) + [(1 -  p)(1 – q)]sW.  
This equation can be rewritten as  
! 
WP =
p(1" p)
1" [(1" p)(1" q)]s
.              (5) 
P is rationally deterred from initiating the firing iff WP ≤ a, which is equivalent to  
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! 
p "
a # as(1# q)
(1# q) # as(1# q)
.                                                                                             (6)  
The fraction on the right side of (6) is the threshold value of p for deterrence.  This 
threshold is always positive; it is less than 1 iff a – as(1 – q) < (1 – q) – as(1 – q), which 
reduces to q < 1 – a.  Hence, if q ≥ 1 – a, P is rationally deterred from firing no matter 
what the value of p is.  
Analogous to (6), Q is rationally deterred from firing iff  
! 
q "
1# a # s(1# a)(1# p)
(1# p) # s(1# a)(1# p)
.                                                                                     (7) 
The threshold value of q, given by the right side of (7), is always positive, and it is less 
than 1 iff p < a.  Hence, if p ≥ a, Q is rationally deterred from firing no matter what the 
value of q is.  
It is rational for P and Q to share the prize iff both (6) and (7) hold.  Rewriting (7) 
as a lower bound on p (rather than an upper bound on q) shows that power sharing in the 
ratio a : (1 – a) is rational for both players iff  
! 
a " (1" q) + s(1" a)(1" q)
q + s(1" a)(1" q)
# p #
a " as(1" q)
(1" a) " as(1" q)
,                                                 (8) 
and, of course, 0 < p < 1.  The deterrence region, which are the points of the (q, p) unit 
square defined by (8), is shaded in Figure 2 for three cases: s approaches 0, 0 < s < 1, and 
s approaches 1.  
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Figure 2 about here 
Note that for any value of a, there are always some (q, p) values for which both 
players prefer to share the prize in the ratio a : (1 – a) rather than fight.  The deterrence 
region includes all points where p ≥ a and q ≥ 1 – a; in particular, it includes points where 
the values of p and q are both near 1.  Unlike the sequential-interaction model, both 
players benefit from sharing when they have high probabilities of eliminating each other.  
The deterrence region also includes points where the values of q and p are near 0, 
but those points are much more confined, as Figure 2 makes clear.  But as s falls, the 
damage caused by firing increases, and the deterrence region near (q, p) = (0, 0) grows 
larger.   
Figure 2 also shows that as s approaches 0, the deterrence region includes the 
rectangle with opposite corners (0, 0) and (1 – a, a), and the rectangle with opposite 
corners (1 – a, a) and (1, 1).  In other words, in a broad band around the 45o line from (0, 
0) to (1, 1), both players will be deterred. 
Note that for any fixed s with 0 < s < 1 (the middle case of both Figure 1 and 
Figure 2), the intersections of the curved lines in Figures 1 and 2 with the q- and p-axes 
are identical.  This shows that at any (q, p) where deterrence is rational in the sequential-
interaction model (Figure 1), it is also rational in the simultaneous-interaction model 
(Figure 2).   
5. How Should Power Be Shared to Induce Stability? 
We now take a different approach to power sharing, asking a design question: 
When power is to be shared in the ratio a : (1 – a), what values of a render power sharing 
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stable?  More specifically, given p and q, what are the stabilizable values of a, if any, and 
for each of these, what values of s support power sharing?  As we will see, the answers 
to these questions depend fundamentally on whether the interaction is sequential or 
simultaneous. 
Sequential Interaction 
Suppose that P and Q are interacting sequentially (SQ).  Then P will rationally be 
deterred from initiating the firing iff VP ≤ a.  From (1),  
! 
VP = fSQ (p,q,s) =
p
1" (1" p)(1" q)s
# a .            (7) 
Analogously, Q will rationally be deterred from initiating the firing iff 
! 
VQ =
q
1" (1" p)(1" q)s
#1" a .                     (8) 
Inequality (8) is equivalent to  
! 
a " gSQ (p,q,s) =
1# q # (1# p)(1# q)s
1# (1# p)(1# q)s
.              (9) 
Combining (7) and (9), power sharing in the ratio a : (1 – a) is stable—neither P nor Q 
will initiate the firing—for all values of a that satisfy the double inequality, 
! 
fSQ (p,q,s) " a " gSQ (p,q,s).            (10) 
Now suppose that p > 0 and q > 0 are fixed and consider the behavior of the 
functions, 
! 
fSQ (p,q,s) and gSQ (p,q,s), as s increases from 0 to 1.  It is easy to verify that 
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P’s expected reward is bracketed by a lower bound of p and an upper bound that is a 
function of p and q, 
! 
fSQ (p,q,0) = p " fSQ (p,q,s) "
p
p + q # pq
= fSQ (p,q,1),        (11) 
for any value of s satisfying 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.  Furthermore, from (7),
! 
fSQ (p,q,s) is strictly 
increasing in s.  From (8), 
! 
gSQ (p,q,s) is strictly decreasing in s, and, analogous to (11),  
! 
gSQ (p,q,0) =1" q # gSQ (p,q,s) #
p " pq
p + q " pq
= gSQ (p,q,1)         (12) 
for any value of s satisfying 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. 
Comparing the two right-hand expressions in (11) and (12), we find 
! 
gSQ (p,q,1) = p " pq < p = fSQ (p,q,1) ,           (13) 
because of our assumptions that p > 0 and q > 0.  Inequality (13) contradicts inequality 
(10), so (10) cannot be true when s = 1.   
Thus, when there is no damage, there is no possibility of power sharing when 
interaction is sequential.  One player will initiate the shooting, which will continue until 
one player is eliminated and the other player obtains all the (undamaged) value.  
Note that the difference, 
! 
gSQ (p,q,s) " fSQ (p,q,s) , is a strictly decreasing function of 
s, because both 
! 
gSQ  and 
! 
" fSQ  are strictly decreasing functions of s.  From (10) it follows 
that power sharing is possible if and only if this strictly decreasing difference is 
nonnegative, allowing for values of a that would stabilize power sharing.  This implies 
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that if power sharing is possible for some specific value of s, say s = s0, then it is also 
possible for all s < s0, and in particular for s = 0.   
But from (11) and (12) we know that 
! 
gSQ (p,q,0) " fSQ (p,q,0)≥ 0 iff (1 – q) – p ≥ 0, 
or, equivalently, p + q ≤ 1.  Therefore, there is no possibility for power sharing (with 
sequential interaction) when p + q > 1.  In other words, if the sum of the elimination 
probabilities is too high, each player will have an incentive to get in the first shot.    
Next suppose that p and q satisfy p + q = 1.  Then 
! 
gSQ (p,q,0) " fSQ (p,q,0) =1" q " p = 0 ,  
which implies that power sharing is possible, but only for s = 0.  In addition, because a 
must satisfy (10), power can be shared only in the ratio a : (1  – a) = p : q.  In conclusion, 
power can be shared if p + q = 1, but only if damage is total (s = 0) and the power-sharing 
agreement exactly reflects the elimination-probability ratio (p : q).  
The case p + q < 1 is all that remains.  By (10), power-sharing can be stabilized for 
any value of s that satisfies fSQ(p, q, s) ≤ gSQ(p, q, s), which is equivalent to 
).,(
)1)(1(
1
max qps
qp
qp
s =
!!
!!
"  
If s = 0, power can be shared in the ratio a : (1 – a) iff a satisfies the inequality p ≤ a ≤ 1 
– q.  But, as can be verified directly, if s = smax(p, q), power must be shared in the ratio a0 
: (1 – a0), where 
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! 
a
0
= a
0
(p,q) =
p
p + q
, 
which is the limiting case discussed in the previous paragraph. 
The possibilities for power sharing are illustrated in Figure 3.  Note that all values 
of a such that p ≤ a ≤ 1 – q induce stability if s = 0, but the  
Figure 3 about here 
interval of stabilizable values of a (shaded area in Figure 3) diminishes in length as s 
increases.  When s reaches smax(p, q), the interval contains only the single point a0(p, q), 
and it vanishes entirely as s increases further. In fact, it can be shown that the length of 
this interval decreases at an increasing rate as s increases. 
We conclude that sequential interaction offers relatively few opportunities to 
stabilize power sharing.  First, players will not be deterred from shooting unless their 
combined probabilities of eliminating their opponents on any round are relatively low; 
otherwise, each player will find it advantageous to try to eliminate its opponent at the 
start.  Second, even when this condition is met, the ratio of their power shares, a : (1 – a), 
must more or less reflect the ratio of their elimination probabilities, p : q, for the players 
to be deterred from firing; in fact, only this ratio stabilizes power sharing if s = smax(p, q),     
Finally, the damage caused by firing on any round must be substantial.  Indeed, if 
the value of the prize that the players seek is relatively undiminished on each round they 
shoot (i.e., if s is high), power sharing may be impossible, even when all other conditions 
for stability are met.  
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Simultaneous Interaction 
Now suppose that P and Q are interacting simultaneously.  Then P will be 
rationally deterred from initiating the firing if WP ≤ a.  From (5), 
! 
WP = fSM (p,q,s) =
p(1" q)
1" (1" p)(1" q)s
# a 
and, analogously for Q,  
! 
WQ = fSM (p,q,s) =
q(1" p)
1" (1" p)(1" q)s
#1" a. 
The latter inequality is equivalent to 
! 
a " gSM (p,q,s) =
1# (1# p)q # (1# p)(1# q)s
1# (1# p)(1# q)s
. 
Therefore, power sharing in the ratio a : (1 – a) is stable for all values of a that satisfy the 
double inequality, 
! 
fSM (p,q,s) " a " gSM (p,q,s).            (14) 
Now suppose that p > 0 and q > 0 are fixed, and consider the behavior of the 
functions,
! 
fSM (p,q,s) and gSM (p,q,s), as s increases from 0 to 1.  As in the case of 
sequential interaction, it is easy to verify that 
! 
fSM (p,q,0) = p " pq # fSM (p,q,s) #
p " pq
p + q " pq
= fSM (p,q,1) 
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for any value of s satisfying 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, and that 
! 
fSM (p,q,s) is strictly increasing in s.  
Similarly, 
! 
gSM (p,q,s)is strictly decreasing in s, and 
! 
gSM (p,q,0) =1" q + pq # gSM (p,q,s) #
p
p + q " pq
= gSM (p,q,1) , 
for any value of s satisfying 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. 
Observe that 
! 
gSM (p,q,1) > fSM (p,q,1) , which implies that inequality (14) is true 
(for appropriate values of a) when s = 1.  Moreover, 
! 
gSM (p,q,s) " fSM (p,q,s)  is a strictly 
decreasing function of s.  Therefore, for any values of p and q, power sharing (with 
simultaneous interaction) is possible for every value of s—that is, power sharing in some 
ratio is feasible, whatever the level of damage shooting causes.  
As in the sequential-interaction case, the length of the interval of stabilizable values 
of a diminishes, at an increasing rate, as s increases.  This is shown in Figure 4 for the 
same values of p and q that were used in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 about here 
The values of s and a that make sequential stabilization possible (darker shade in 
Figure 4) can be shown to be a subset of those that make simultaneous stabilization 
possible (lighter shade).  Note in Figure 4 that  
.)1,,()1,,( and )1,,()1,,( qpgqpfqpgqpf SQSQSMSM ==  
However, the interval between these points stabilizes power sharing in the case of 
 21 
simultaneous interaction but not in the case of sequential interaction.    
 Clearly, simultaneous interaction is much more potent a tool than sequential 
interaction for stabilizing power sharing.  More specifically,  
• simultaneous stabilization is possible for any values of p and q, whereas 
  sequential stabilization is possible only if p + q ≤ 1; 
• if p + q ≤ 1, simultaneous stabilization is possible for every value of s, whereas  
   sequential stabilization is possible only if s ≤ smax(p, q); 
• if p + q ≤ 1 and s ≤ smax(p, q), simultaneous stabilization produces a wider interval  
   of values of a than does sequential stabilization. 
The superior ability of simultaneous interaction to stabilize power sharing is made 
even more evident in Figure 5, which fixes p = 1/2 and asks how the stabilizable power  
sharing ratios depend on q.  The figure includes three cases, s = 0 (total damage), s = 1/2, 
and s = 1 (no damage).   
Figure 5 about here 
Observe that as q increases from 0, the stabilizable values of a decrease.  For 
example, when s = 0 and stabilization is simultaneous, values of a from 1/2 to 1 can be 
stabilized if q = 0, but at q = 1 the stabilizable values of a run from 0 to1/2.  If interaction 
is sequential, the situation is bleaker: There are no stabilizable values of a when q exceeds 
1/2.   Thus, it is apparent that simultaneous interaction is far more efficacious at 
stabilizing power sharing than sequential interaction, especially when the elimination 
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probability of a player increases.   
Increasing s (i.e., decreasing damage) diminishes the possibility of stabilization in 
both the simultaneous and sequential cases.  As suggested by the three cases in Figure 5, 
if a particular point (q, a) is stabilizable (for either sequential or simultaneous interaction) 
for any particular value of s, then it is also stabilizable for any smaller value of s.  For 
instance, any point, (q, a), that is shaded (either light or dark) when s = 1/2 is also shaded 
when s = 0. Thus, the more the damage caused by shooting, the more players will try to 
avoid it.     
6.  Conclusions 
Why are the incentives to share power in the simultaneous-interaction case greater 
than in the sequential-interaction case?  The former allows for the possibility that both 
players will be eliminated and, consequently, receive none of the prize, whereas the latter 
model allows for at most one player to be eliminated.  This makes the prospect of 
fighting more unsavory if interaction is simultaneous, raising the value to the players of 
sharing the prize.7  
To deter players from firing and encourage power sharing, therefore, it helps if the 
players can respond rapidly, if not immediately, to firing by an opponent and so, 
potentially, wreak more damage.  A hair trigger, despite the risks of accidental firing, 
therefore strengthens deterrence.  So does the doctrine of “launch on warning,” given 
                                                 
7 The demise of dueling in the early 20th century seems to have been largely a function of the moral 
repugnance that came to be associated with it.  But it also may have been due to the greater possibility that 
both players would be killed or wounded as pistols became more accurate.  For a review of recent books on 
dueling, see Krystal (2007).  
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good intelligence and surveillance, because it enables the attacked player to retaliate 
before it is hit. 
The near-simultaneity of possible retaliation by the superpowers during the Cold 
War arguably benefited deterrence, Wohlstetter’s (1959) warning of the “delicate balance 
of terror” notwithstanding.  Of course, mutual assured destruction (MAD) was never 
entirely assured, because the doomsday machines the superpowers put in place were not 
certain to work.   
Failures of either command and control or political will were a constant concern, 
making the doomsday machines at best probabilistic (Brams, 1985, p. 36; Brams and 
Kilgour, 1988, pp. 50-52).  However, as each side developed second-strike capability—
primarily through its submarine-launched nuclear missiles, which could not be destroyed 
in a first strike despite the increased accuracy of ICBMs—MAD became more secure 
and, perhaps, less mad.  Each side could ride out a first strike and still wreak destruction 
on the other side. 
The simultaneous-interaction model mirrors this second-strike capability.  
Although firing may not literally be simultaneous, a player can respond to an attack, even 
if devastated by it, so a successful shot in simultaneous interaction does not “eliminate” 
an opponent entirely.  
Put differently, even when great damage is inflicted on a player, it may be able to 
respond.  What makes power sharing a rational strategy in this situation is the damage 
that both sides incur if both are eliminated at once (e.g., possibly a “nuclear winter” in the 
case of a nuclear exchange). 
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Unlike nuclear warfare, the damage caused by terrorist acts tends not to be highly 
destructive, except over long periods of time.  Thus low damage, as well as sequentiality, 
may make terrorists reluctant to share power; instead, they do better by slowly wearing 
down the government.  Indeed, the government may hasten its own demise if it fights 
back heavy-handedly, alienating the populace and, ultimately, losing its support if it is 
unable to detect and destroy many terrorist targets.  
To increase the damage factor for terrorists, the best counterstrategy would seem to 
be to dry up their sources of support, especially financial, that derive from the populace.  
This, of course, is easier said than done.  But we emphasize that the main lesson of our 
models is that the s factor—specifically, diminishing the value of the prize by making 
shooting (attacks) as damaging as possible—is the key to making power sharing 
attractive to both sides. 
Can our models be extended to n-person power-sharing games, starting with truels, 
or 3-person extensions of duels (Kilgour and Brams, 1997; Bossert, Brams, and Kilgour, 
2002)?  The combinatorial possibilities of shooting rapidly multiply as the players 
increase, but so do the potential benefits of not shooting, so we think this question is well 
worth exploring in today’s multipolar world.  
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Figure 2. Simultaneous-Interaction Model
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Figure 3. Sequential Stabilization (Shaded Area)
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Figure 4. Comparison of Simultaneous Stabilization
(Light Shading) with Sequential Stabilization
(Dark Shading)
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Figure 5. Stabilizable Values of  a when  = 1⁄2
Simultaneous Stabilization: Light Shading
Sequential Stabilization: Dark Shading 
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